Introduction
'The rules of the game have changed forever . Professionals everywhere, from China to Costa Rica, can work from home as if they were in offices next door to each other . which requires us to run faster in order to stay in the same place . ' Friedman (2005, cover) .
The above quote is taken from Thomas Friedman's book The World is Flat, which has been a bestseller since it appeared in 2005. The remarkable success of the book reflects to a certain extent the present fears with respect to increasing globalization. Using many examples, Friedman argues that distance (however defined) is no longer a dominant characteristic of the world economy, or will cease to be so in the very near future. Competition is thought to be a race to the bottom, with the lowest wage countries as the big winners. It seems almost commonly accepted knowledge that the world is getting smaller in an economic sense. The Information and Computer Technology (ICT) revolution only just started, and communication with people on the other side of the globe has become a trivial exercise. The ease with which international communications can be established has convinced some researchers that 'distance' is becoming less important than it used to be. The term distance should be viewed as a general concept not only related to transportation costs but also reflecting differences in language, culture, religion, legal systems, etc. All these factors might make trading relations more difficult. According to ICT optimists, such as Cairncross (2001-also a New York Times bestseller), these differences will disappear or become far less important than they currently are.
In a broad sense, there seem to be two groups of distance researchers, namely (i) the 'death of distance' group, which argues that the location of economic activity becomes rapidly less important, and (ii) the 'not so fast' group, which focuses on evidence to determine the extent to which distance still matters in the world economy. As a representative of the death of distance group, Thomas Friedman provides many anecdotes to convince the reader how small the world has become. Few people, for example, realize that when ordering a burger in a drive-in at McDonalds, one might actually talk to someone in India. As a representative of the not so fast group, Feenstra (1998) provides another anecdote. The production cost of a Barbie doll is $1-but it sells for about $10-in the USA. This implies that the cost of transportation, marketing and retailing have an ad valorem tax equivalent of 900%. In a long and careful survey, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) conclude that this so-called tax equivalent of trade costs for industrialized countries is 170%. This is much smaller than the Barbie doll example suggests but still remarkably high. 1 In related macromonetary economic literature, Obsfeld and Rogoff (2000) point out six major macroeconomic puzzles, all based on the relevance of trade barriers.
We illustrate the apparent consequences of trade barriers, whatever be their origin. We therefore do not measure distance costs as such (see van Wincoop, 2004, or Anderson and Neary, 2005) but focus on the consequences of these costs, thus illustrating how barriers to trade shape the world economy. We do so by showing that up to the present there is no such thing as a 'great global equalizer'. Income per capita levels vary greatly across the globe, with only little indication that this situation will change soon. This is an important observation, because neoclassical trade theory predicts that factor prices-income per capita-will be equalized if only free trade would exist.
2 If this is not the case, it could be a sign of trade barriers. This is the next step in this paper. We show that indeed geographical trade and investment patterns illustrate the (growing?) importance of distance. In contrast to Friedman's main line of thought, we argue that: 'the world is not flat, nor is distance dead'. Our findings are in accordance with McCann (2008) , who argues that: 'it is possible to reconcile all of the seemingly conflicting evidence by adopting the argument that the global economy simultaneously exhibits trends towards both increasing globalization and localization'. The latter is tied to: 'Cities [which] are increasingly seen to be the critical context for growth'.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. We take Friedman (2005) seriously and discuss a number of his key propositions, which are: we have to 'Run faster to stay in the same place' (cover), competition creates 'a more level playing field' (p. 52), the revolution in transport technology results in a world 'without regard to geography' (p. 176), which also implies that 'small companies could suddenly see around the world ' (p. 143) . According to us, these statements capture the main message of Friedman's The World is Flat (2005) . The key idea seems to be 2-fold: first, various barriers (to trade or factor mobility) that previously protected markets from competition have either vanished or declined. Second, such a reduction in barriers automatically implies an increase in competition-or in the contestability of markets and hence has the potential to bring about income convergence.
The next section discusses (per capita) income developments since 1950 by investigating (changes in) the extent of income dispersion and income convergence in relation to the size of different economies. 'Income inequality' focuses on changes in income inequality since 1950. 'Regional and within-country income inequality' discusses leapfrogging (which country is in the lead and which country is lagging behind) and convergence from a longer perspective (2000 years). 'Leapfrogging; leaders and laggards for the last 2000 years' analyses the relationship between distance and international trade, while 'The death of distance?' focuses on investment flows and production networks. 'International production networks', finally, concludes.
Income developments since 1950
The primary objective of our paper is to establish empirically whether or not the (economic) earth is Brakman and van Marrewijk becoming 'flat', that is whether or not the death of distance group referred to in 'Introduction' is right that the location of economic activity is becoming less important, such that indeed income earners in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have to 'run faster' than competitors in order to 'stay in the same place'. This citation suggests that the threat from countries like India or China is such that income levels in OECD countries might even fall relative to the new giants. Given the attention views like this receive from policy makers and in the press one likes to know whether these claims have a factual basis. To answer this question, we use several methods and data sets in different periods of time, as explained below.
Income levels
We start off with a discussion of the economic developments since the second half of the 20th century in 'Income developments since 1950' and 'Income inequality', going back further in time in 'Regional and within-country income inequality '. 3 For the period 1950-2003, we have detailed annual information available regarding population and income for 137 countries and 8 regions (groups of smaller countries), together constituting the entire world, see Table A2 in the Appendix. The most important, and by far largest, 'region' consists of the 'former USSR' group of countries. The population size of these 145 entities differs enormously, ranging from a low of 80 thousand for the Seychelles to a high of 1.29 billion for China. The same holds for income levels of the 145 countries/ regions, ranging from a low of $0.2 billion for São Tomé and Principe to a high of $8341 billion for the USA. Since our main question to be answered regarding the economic 'flatness' of the world is based on competition at the individual level, we will mostly focus on the ratio of income and population by discussing developments in income per capita. This does not imply that size is unimportant (see below). The average income per capita level for the 145 countries/regions in 2003 is $6843 with a low of $212 for Congo Democratic Republic (Zaire) and a high of $29,037 for the USA (137 times the Zaire level). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of income per capita for a selection of years (equally spaced across time) in the period 1950-2003 by providing a histogram with the natural logarithm of income per capita on the horizontal axis (to compactify the range) and the number of countries within a certain range on the vertical axis. In 1950, for example, one country (Guinea Bissau) has ln(income per capita) below 5.7 (income level of $300), whereas seven countries are in the range between 5.7 and 6.0, and so on. The panels of Figure 1 show a gradual movement from the left to the right, indicating increasing income per capita levels for most countries. Note that we discuss absolute income changes not relative positions. Clearly, as noted above, there is considerable variation in income per capita. It is hard to determine any trends in the panels of the figure by visual inspection, although comparing the first panel (with most of the mass on the left-hand side) with the last panel (where the mass is more evenly distributed) seems to suggest an increase (rather than a decrease) in income dispersion. The graphs suggest a crude answer to the citation at the start of the paper.
Observation 1 (economic growth).
Most countries do not stay in the same place as far as absolute income per capita is concerned. More importantly, income dispersion has increased between 1950 and 2003.
Size matters
It is time to proceed with a more formal analysis. If the world is becoming economically flat and fierce competition between workers, doing more or less the same tasks in different parts of the world, this should ensure that minuscule differences in wage rates disappear. This can be done through trade in tradable commodities, labour migration or through the location decisions of firms. In all these cases, competition should result in a tendency for income levels of similar workers to become more equal over time, that is, these income levels should converge'. Figure 2 gives a standard answer whether or not this is the case, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for a detailed explanation. The figure shows on the horizontal axis the (natural logarithm of) initial income levels for the various countries in 1950. On the vertical axis, it shows the annualized per capita income growth rate for these countries in the period . The line through the scatter plot shows a regression line, which is almost horizontal (slightly upward sloping). This is problematic for the convergence hypothesis because countries with low initial levels of income should grow faster than countries with initially high levels of income in order to converge. Evidently, Figure 2 does not support this hypothesis. Table 1 reports simple regressions of the annual economic growth rate of a country/region in a specified (sub-)period on the natural logarithm of initial income per capita. If there is convergence, one expects initially poor countries to grow faster than initially rich countries, so the reported coefficient on initial income in Table 1 should be negative and statistically significant. In contrast, the estimated coefficients on initial income level for the subperiods is either not statistically significant or point at income 'divergence', rather than convergence (for the sub-periods 1963-1976 and 1989-2003, respectively) . For the period as a whole, the effect of initial income on economic growth is 'nil'. Moreover, the explanatory power of the regression (R 2 , the 'explained' share of the variance in the economic growth rate) is very poor for the various sub-periods (no more than 4.1%) and nil for the period as a whole. Although there is an important caveat to this analysis to be discussed below, the following conclusion is warranted.
Observation 2 (no convergence).
The impression from Figure 1 , that there is no support for global convergence, is supported by a more formal analysis of the data.
The various panels of Figure 3 illustrate that Figure 2 and Table 1 can be misleading regarding the developments in the world economy because all countries are equally important, independent of the size of the economy. 4 This makes an observation for the Seychelles (with 80 thousand inhabitants in 2003) as important as an observation for China (with a 16,000 times larger population in 2003). Similarly, 13 countries have a population less than 0.1% of the Chinese population, with a total of 8.4 million people (less than 0.7% of China's population). Nonetheless, in Figure 2 , the annual observations for these 13 countries receive a weight 13 times higher than China's single annual observation in the analysis in 'Income developments since 1950' and 'Income inequality'.
5 Figure 3 vividly illustrates the repercussions of these observations for the sub-period regressions summarized in Table 1 using a 'bubble' diagram which shows the natural logarithm of initial income per capita of each country on the horizontal axis, the annual economic growth rate of the country on the vertical axis, and depicts the country's importance by making the size of the bubble proportional to the size of the initial population.
In view of the size of their populations, China and India are the most important, separately identified observations in Figure 3 . Of the high-income countries, we separately identify Japan, the USA and the (former) USSR. In the first two periods (panels 3a and 3b; the period 1950-1976), 1950-1963 1963-1976 1976-1989 1989-2003 1950-2003 
Income inequality
The previous section has studied studied income levels and economic growth rates, but not income inequality directly. We now analyse this aspect in more detail. There are various methods to determine income inequality. We will use the popular method of drawing Lorenz curves and calculating the Gini coefficient. The Lorenz curve is obtained by ranking the countries in terms of income per in detail, the two curves are very similar with respect to the evolution of income inequality over time. Third, we note in both cases that income inequality declines in the 1950s, rises in the 1960s (to reach a peak in 1968 or 1973, depending on the number of identified countries), is relatively stable in the 1970s, and starts to decline since about 1979.
7 Not coincidentally, this is the year the economic reform process in China (initiated in December 1978) starts to take effect. The decline in global income inequality seems to speed up around 1991, arguably the year at which the economic reform process in India starts to have an impact. The economic development in these two populous nations therefore surely has an impact on global inequality. We summarize our findings as follows.
Observation 4A (global income inequality peaked in the 1970s)
Global income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient reached a peak in the 1970s and has declined since about 1980. The Gini coefficient analysis indicates income convergence and corroborates Friedman's contention.
Until now we used two concepts of income inequality. First, income per capita in each country, which assumes that each country can be described by a single representative individual. Second, the population-weighted average income per capita in each country; this assumes that all individuals in each country receive the same income (we used this to show that size matters). But we neglected a third measure, that is individual income differences. The assumption that all individuals within a country receive the same income is clearly not true. So looking at income inequality should also measure within-country income inequality. We return to this issue in the next section.
The long-term analysis so far suggests that over the past 60 years, the 'forces of globalization' have first given rise to an increase (not a decline) in income dispersion, and only relatively recently (since about 1980) a reduction in global income inequality (with a large role for India and China).
8 This is, in fact, not surprising since standard trade theory tells us that global competition equalizes wages of identical workers who perform similar tasks under certain conditions. 9 But this is hardly ever the case. Most income differences are based on the fact that workers in rich countries have more and better technology available to do their jobs. This raises productivity and thus wages. Only a limited share of the workforce is in direct competition with the unskilled workers in China or India. There is also some consensus among trade economists that the difficult labour market position of low-skilled workers in developed countries is caused by domestic technological developments instead of global competition (see Feenstra, 2004 , for a review).
Regional and within-country income inequality
The above country-level analysis may obscure important economic developments at lower levels of aggregation. Although Thomas Friedman does not discuss the issue of the level of aggregation explicitly, it does relate to his main point: reductions in transportation costs increase competition and reduce cost differences. In principle, there is no reason why this should only hold at the intercountry level. This is why we will make a small detour in this section, and take a look at a different level of aggregation. To illustrate this, we discuss some regional income data. Most regional convergence analysis analyses regions within a specific country or within a coherent group of countries. Sala-i-Martin (1995, 2004) , for example, analyse convergence across US states, convergence across Japanese prefectures, and convergence across European regions. In contrast to the country-level results presented in 'Income developments since 1950' these studies usually do find evidence of convergence at the regional level. There are, however, two important caveats. First, restricting the analysis to regions within a country or a coherent group of countries is not representative of global regional income trends. This is similar to the 'biased sample' problem at the country level.
10 When Baumol (1986) analysed convergence from 1870 to 1979 by investigating 16 industrialized countries, he found strong evidence for income convergence. As pointed out by DeLong (1988) , however, Baumol's country sample is biased as he focuses on 16 countries with high income levels in 1979. The evidence for country-level income convergence tends to disappear when an unbiased country sample is taken.
Second, the degree of regional income convergence, as measured by the estimated speed of convergence, tends to 'decrease' over time. This observation holds for the states of the USA, the prefectures in Japan and the regions in the European Union (EU). It is illustrated in Figure 6 for regional income convergence in the EU using the Martin (2001) data. As explained below, realizing this tendency of a recent absence of regional income convergence in the EU is crucial for understanding recent developments in the EU regional income distribution.
The EU identifies 'regions' at three different levels, referred to as 'NUTS' regions.
11 The 27 EU countries consist of 95 NUTS1 regions, 268 NUTS2 regions or 1284 NUTS3 regions. Focusing on the NUTS2 level (which is probably most readily comparable between countries), we collected income and population data for 257 regions, to construct Lorenz curves and calculate Gini coefficients in the period 1995-2004. 12 Figure 7 provides the Lorenz curves for 1995 and 2004, the most 'unequal' and the most 'equal' regional EU income distribution in this period, respectively. It is clear that regional EU income is much more equally distributed than global income (compare Figure 4) . The figure suggests that this distribution is becoming a bit more equal. Indeed, the average Gini coefficient for the EU regions in this period is 0.2075, varying from a high of 0.2145 in 1995 to a low of 0.1979 in 2004 (see Figure 8 ). This slight trend, however, still obscures within-country effects. Looking at regions instead of countries still assumes that within a region income per capita is the same, which is not the case.
Measurements of within-country or region income inequality are not trivial, as not all countries have household surveys to provide the necessary data, and if so do not use the same definitions of income (see Milanovic, 2006a Milanovic, , 2006b . In general, the following picture emerges. There is consensus in the literature that the across-country inequality recently decreases (see Observation 4A), and also that the across-country differences account for 70% of global inequality and the within-country inequality for about 30% (Sala-i- Martin, 2006) . There is no clear consensus, however, on developments with respect to within-country inequality, which seems to be more volatile than the across-country developments. Still, we give an indication of the withincountry/region income inequality using the Theil index. An advantage of the (non-negative) Theil index (where 0 indicates complete income equality) is that it can be decomposed into different components, and the within-country/region income inequality can be calculated without detailed census information. Sala-i- Martin (2006) , for example, uses this to decompose global income inequality to a within-country and across-country inequality (p. 388):
The 'within-country' component is the amount of inequality that would exist in the world if all countries had the same income per capita . The 'across-country' component is the amount of inequality that would exist in the world if all citizens within each country had the same level of income, but there were differences in per capita incomes across countries. , Table 1 ). BS1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) ; BS1995, Barro and Sala-iMartin (1995) ; A1995a, Armstrong (1995a); A1995b, Armstrong (1995b) ; EC1997, European Commission (1997); BP1999, Button and Pentecost (1999) . The analysis is at the NUTS1 level for BS1991, BS1995 and A1995b and at the NUTS2 level otherwise.
Noting that global income inequality as measured by the Theil index has fallen in the period 1970-2000, he then uses the decomposition to show that the within-country component has become more important over time (see Table A4 ). An obvious, important example in this respect is the increased income inequality in China.
A similar decomposition for EU regional income inequality as measured using the Theil index, which (like the Gini coefficient) has fallen in the period 1995-2004, reveals, similarly , that the regional income inequality between EU countries has fallen, whereas regional income inequality within EU countries has increased, see Figure 8 . As such it continues as a trend noted in Duro (2001) using data for 1982-1995. As also pointed out by Puga (2002) , and discussed by him in a Geographical Economics/New Economic Geography (NEG) framework, regional inequality (in terms of income and unemployment) within EU countries has recently increased, not decreased. In this context, Puga highlights the importance of increased inequality in terms of economic accessibility among EU regions (absolute gains for most regions, but relatively larger gains for the core regions). This finding weakens the conclusion of Observation 4, as noted below.
Observation 4B (increased within-country inequality since the 1980s):
Decomposing global income inequality or EU regional income inequality to a within-country and across-country component using the Theil index shows that within-country inequality has increased since about the 1980s. This is contrary to Friedman's assertions on income convergence to the extent that this should hold within countries.
Leapfrogging; leaders and laggards for the last 2000 years 'That is why I introduced the idea that the world has gone from round to flat. Everywhere you turn, hierarchies are being challenged from below .' (Friedman 2005, p. 45) .
The above discussion has focused on the extent of income dispersion and income inequality. The impression we give is that to some extent, current developments in the world economy are 'business as usual', with the exceptions of India and China. We have not paid any attention, however, to the question whether leading positions of some countries in the world economy might be challenged in the future, or that these positions are stable over time. Friedman might object to our historical analyses in the previous sections that he is looking forward in time instead of backward. We argue that looking further back in history is necessary; hierarchies are indeed challenged from below, and this happens all the time, but this only becomes clear in a historical perspective. If one only considers the last 25 years or so, there is no leapfrogging taking place.
Currently the question is could China be the future leader in the world economy? This brings us to an important psychological, economic and historical empirical phenomenon, leapfrogging. To identify who is 'leading' or 'lagging', we continue to focus on the personal level by looking at income per capita levels, but now for a very long time period. The extent of a country's lead or lag is expressed as a country's income per capita as a percentage of the world average income per capita in the year under consideration. As an added bonus, this will provide us with additional information on the degree of income convergence or divergence, as discussed below.
We can identify 28 individual (current) countries from all continents for which fairly reliable population and income data for the last 2000 years have recently been provided by Maddison (2007) , namely 2 countries in Africa, 3 in the Americas, 6 in Asia and 15 in Europe, Australia and New Zealand. Together, these 28 countries (with about 3.7 billion inhabitants in 2007) represent about 82% of the world population in Year 1, gradually declining to about 56% of the world total in 2003. Although detailed information for the remaining 197 countries in the world is not available for the entire period, it is possible to construct seven different regions-groups of countries for which fairly reliable aggregate population and income data are available for the last 2000 years, see Table 2 for an  overview and Table A1 in the Appendix for the list of (current) countries belonging to a particular region. Taken together, this provides us with 35 observations (28 countries plus seven regions) on the distribution of population and income across the world in the last two millennia. Figure 9 depicts the respective leaders and laggards over time in terms of income per capita, see Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix for details. In Year 1, Italy (Rome) was the leader, with an income level about 73% higher than the world average. The leading position was taken over by Iran and Iraq (44% above the average) in Year 1000, before it was regained by Italy (Venice, Florence) in 1500 (94% above the average). The Dutch trading power gained prominence from 1600 to about 1820, with a relative income peak in 1700 (246% above average). Since then, the lead has switched frequently, going first to the UK then to Australia, followed by the USA, Switzerland and again the USA. The highest relative peak (374% above average) is reached in 1999. It is not only clear that the leadership changes from one country to another over time but also clear that (despite prolonged periods of decline) the relative income position of the leader tends to increase over time.
Many countries qualified for the top 'lagging' position in Year 1, including all of the Americas, Australia, Japan and what is now the former USSR; 14 For most of the rest of the 20th century, India and China (the currently feared top globalization countries from an OECD perspective) took turns in being the world's laggard. It is again clear that there is leapfrogging (the top laggard position changes regularly) and that the relative income position of the laggard tends to decrease over time.
Given the fact that many observers expect that China will be the next world economic leader, it is interesting to take a closer look at China's prospects of becoming a world economic leader. Table 3 shows the real per capita economic growth experience for China and the USA in the period 1950-2003 and for the four sub-periods. The American growth rate is relatively stable over time, with an average per capita increase of 2.10% per year. China's performance is rather different. For the first two sub-periods (26 years), its growth rate was very close to that of the USA. For the last two sub-periods, its growth rate was 3.5 to almost 5% per year higher than the USA.
In 2003, income per capita (corrected for purchasing power parity (PPP)) in the USA was GK$29,037 and in China GK$4609. The time required for China to leapfrog the USA depends, of course, on your guesstimate of future economic growth rates for China and the USA. In view of its steady development over time, let us assume that the American per capita growth rate continues to be 2.10% in real terms per year (the 1950-2003 Table A3 and A4 regarding the laggards in the years 1 and 1000. average). Using the average growth experience for China in 1950-2003 as an indication (4.44% per capita per year), it is straightforward to calculate that it will take a substantial 81 years for per capita income in China to become equal to per capita income in the USA, which would occur in the year 2084. An alarmist may, of course, point at the bigger difference in growth rates in recent years and argue that leapfrogging may only take 50 or 43 years and occur at about the year 2050 (see the last two rows of Table 3 ). Many economists will argue that it is highly unlikely that China will maintain the recent big difference in growth rates. Taking earlier sub-period experiences listed in Table 3 into consideration, it may easily take more than 250 or even 1000 years before leapfrogging occurs, if ever. The point is, as illustrated in Figure 10 , that small reductions in China's current fast growth rate will dramatically increase the time required for leapfrogging to occur. In view of this and in light of the experience of the last century, immanent leapfrogging of the USA by China is not very likely. This brings us to Observation 5.
Observation 5 (Relative leapfrogging and income divergence)
Investigating income per capita relative to the world average, we observe that there is frequent leapfrogging (different countries are in the lead or lag behind). Moreover, there is income divergence: the leader's relative position improves and the laggard's relative position deteriorates over time. Hierarchies are indeed challenged over time. However, at present no spectacular leapfrogs can be expected in the near future. Figure 11 illustrates the discussion above by using bubble diagrams for selected years.
15 Panels a and b show the overwhelming initial influence of India and China in terms of total population. Together these two countries account for 60 and 50% of the world population in the years 1 and 1700, respectively.
16 Panels a and b also show the rather exceptional leads (an income level far above all other countries) of Italy in Year 1 and of The Netherlands in Year 1700. This contrasts with panels c and d (the years 1870 and 1950), where a range of other countries is close in income level to the leader's position. All panels allow us to identify most of the OECD countries quite easily and track the developments and relative importance of individual countries or regions. Italy, for example, has remained a relatively prosperous nation most of the time. Japan already moved up in the ranks quickly from 1870 to 1950, before the Japanese miracle started. Most impressive is the development for the USA, which is a lagging tiny population speck in panels a and b, to move swiftly up the ranks, take over the lead and rapidly increase in population size in the 19th and 20th century.
17
The lagging position of Africa (excluding Egypt and Morocco) in these two centuries is evident from panels c and d, where Africa sits firmly at the bottom of the figures, indicating a low growth rate. Table 4 provides summary statistics on level regressions corresponding to Figure 11 . If we go back long enough in time, namely 1000 or 2000 years, there is some support for convergence (the impact of the initial income level is negative and statistically significant). For the most recent 500 years, however, we find no support for level convergence, whereas there is some support for level divergence in the period 1820-2003. Observation 6 summarizes these findings.
Observation 6 (convergence after 1000 years, but not since 1500)
There is support for convergence after 1000 or 2000 years, but no support for convergence since 1500.
The death of distance?
'The net result of this convergence was the creation of a global, Web-enabled playing field that allows for multiple forms of collaboration-the sharing of knowledge and work-in real time, without regard to geography, distance, or in the near future even language .' (Friedman, 2005, pp. 176-177) .
A central theme in Friedman's book is that the world becomes smaller. The citation above indicates that he has distance in mind. On many occasions in the book it is argued that distance, as a broad measure of trade barriers, becomes smaller, such that:
'it shrank the world from a size large to a size medium . around the year 2000 we entered a whole new era . shrinking the world from a size small to a size tiny .' (Friedman, 2005, pp. 9-10) .
For trade economists, this is a puzzling observation because there is a well-known empirical regularity, the so-called gravity equation, which shows that distance is an important determinant of international trade flows. The export of goods and services from one country to another involves time, effort and hence costs. Goods have to be physically loaded and unloaded, transported by truck, train, ship or plane, packed, insured, traced, etc. before they reach their destination. There they have to be unpacked, checked, assembled and displayed before they can be sold to the consumer or an intermediate firm. A distribution and maintenance network has to be established, and the exporter will have to familiarize herself with the (legal) rules and procedures in another country, usually in another language and embedded in a different culture. All of this involves costs, which tend to increase with distance. As indicated above, this can be physical distance, which may be hampered or alleviated by geographical phenomena such as mountain ranges or easy access to good waterways, or political, cultural or social distance, which also require time and effort before one can successfully engage in international business (see on the role of 'time ' Harrigan and Venables, 2006) .
The gravity equation impact of distance on the size of trade flows can be summarized as follows. If A and B are two countries with income levels GDP A and GDP B , the hypothesized size of their bilateral trade flow is given by
where the distance A to B variable can be measured in various ways (for example in kilometres between the main economic centres of the countries) and the parameters a, b and h are to be estimated using actual data. Equation (1) indicates that the larger the two trading partners, measured by their income levels, and the smaller the distance between them, the larger the bilateral trade flow. The empirical evidence in favour of the gravity equation is overwhelming. As a result, the gravity equation has been used in numerous empirical trade studies.
In view of the frequent use of the gravity equation, Disdier and Head (2006) were able to perform a so-called meta-analysis of gravity model estimates, which leads to a striking conclusion. Disdier and Head analyse 1467 estimated distance effects (that is, estimates of the parameter h in Equation (1) on the impact of distance on international trade flows) gathered from a wide range of different studies. Their findings can be effectively summarized 18 The higher the estimated parameter h, the stronger the negative effect of distance on the size of trade flows, and therefore the more important distance and location is for determining these trade flows. The mean effect of distance on trade for the period as a whole is around 0.9 (with 90% of all estimates between 0.28 and 1.55). This implies that a 10% increase in distance leads to a 9% reduction of international trade flows. The estimates in Figure 12 suggest that the distance effect became less important between 1890 and 1940. Most striking, however, is the increased (not decreased) estimated distance effect in the second half of the 20th century (also with some increased variance). In sharp contrast to the opinion of the death of distance group, distance is therefore becoming more (not less) important for determining international trade flows. See Disdier and Head (2006) for a further discussion.
The next question is how the findings of Disdier and Head manifest themselves in world trade flows. This is illustrated for Europe in Table 5 by providing regional imports and exports for Europe as a percentage of total imports and exports for selected years. The table shows that, despite two world wars, the isolationist period between the wars and the enormous increase in the volume of world trade from 1950 onwards, the regional distribution of European trade is quite stable, with a dominant (and, if anything, increasing) local component.
Europe itself was and still is the most important source and destination of its trade flows. In this sense, world trade is not global but 'provincial', since the main trading partners are still to be found among the closest neighbours (various barriers to trade may contribute to this finding; see, above 'The death of distance?'). Our findings are summarized in Observation 7.
Observation 7 (trade is distance determined)
International trade flows are to a large extent determined by distance; a 10% increase in distance reduces trade by about 9%. Moreover, the importance of distance seems to increase, not decrease, in the second half of the 20th century, which is in strong contrast with the contention of Friedman in this respect.
International production networks
Looking only at trade flows might not convince the advocates of the death of distance group arguing in favour of a global economy that becomes 'flatter'. Most international trade is in the hands of multinational corporations, which might benefit the most from a flatter global economy. Arguably, the increased importance of multinational activity is one of the most distinctive features of the present wave of globalization. This allows multinational firms to 'slice up the value chain' in order to increase profitability; this term indicates that different parts of the production process are increasingly placed in different locations to benefit from economies of scale, skill differences and low wages in order to increase overall multinational profitability. The ICT revolution makes the relocation of firms or parts of firms increasingly possible. Looking only at trade flows might obscure trends in the global relocation of firms. This relatively new aspect of world trade might in fact be the inspiration of Friedman's citation presented at the beginning of this paper, namely that we have 'to run faster in order to stay in the same place'. The numerous anecdotes in Friedman's book suggest that he, indeed, often has the activities of the multinational corporation in mind. Discussions on foreign direct investment (FDI) first have to answer the question what type of FDI is being discussed. The standard distinction that is made in the literature is between so-called vertical FDI and horizontal FDI. The motive for the former type is cost differences (low wages), whereas the dominant motive for the latter type is market seeking (high wages). The distinction is important because, for example, low-wage countries are attractive for vertical FDI, but not for horizontal FDI. In both cases, it is very difficult to derive clear predictions what the effects are on relative wages in the host versus home countries as one has to calculate relative factor intensities of the relocated firms relative to local factor intensities; a priori convergence is as likely as divergence (see Barba-Navaretti and Venables, chs 3 and 4). Also the relation between the two types of FDI and transport cost is different: horizontal FDI is stimulated by high transport cost (jumping over the trade barrier), whereas vertical FDI is stimulated by low transport costs (reimporting becomes less expensive).
What about the facts on the relocation of activity through FDI? 21 Recently, many surveys on the behaviour of the multinational enterprise have become available (see e.g. Markusen, 2002, or Barba-Navaretti and Venables, 2004) . The findings of the literature can be illustrated with the help of Table 7 . Most striking in the table is that both inflows and outflows of FDI are directed towards, and come from, high-wage developed countries. This suggests that most FDI is market seeking, that is, is attracted towards large, high-income and skilled labour abundant countries, with a declining relative inflow only very recently. In view of the volatility of FDI, we conclude that the often Our discussion in the main text focuses on trade in goods, not services. As illustrated in Figure 13 , the services sectors tend to become increasingly important as economies become wealthier and more sophisticated. At the global level in 2003, for example, average employment in the services sectors was 57.6% of total employment, ranging from a minimum of 12.9% for China (with a per capita GDP of $1067) to a maximum of 80.3% for Hong Kong (with a per capita GDP of $25,633). Typical examples in this respect are also provided by Bangladesh, with a GDP per capita of $395 and 23.5% of employment in the services sector, and the USA, with a GDP per capita of $35,566 and 75.2% employment in the services sector. 20 A popular method for distinguishing between goods and services is to argue that services, such as getting a haircut, are produced and consumed simultaneously, although not necessarily at the same place. A less sophisticated, but effective, method is to argue that if you can drop it on your foot it must be a good.
If the share of services employment increases, it must be at the expense of the share of some other type of employment. In general, agricultural sectors tend to become less important as economies become wealthier. In 2003, for example, average employment in the agricultural sectors was 17.1% of total employment, ranging from a minimum of 0.1% for Macao (with a per capita GDP of $15,892) to a maximum of 62.1% for Bangladesh. Agricultural employment in the USA, for example, was 2.4% of total employment.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) identifies four modes of international supply of services: Cross-border: services supplied from the territory of one country into the territory of another country (e.g. telemedical advice or distance training). Consumption abroad: services supplied in the territory of a nation to the consumers of another nation (e.g. tourists or foreign students).
Commercial presence: services supplied by one country through commercial presence in the territory of another country (e.g. affiliates of banks or hotels). Presence of natural persons: services supplied by a country through the presence of natural persons in another country (e.g. consultant or health worker).
Technological developments (such as improvements in telecommunication) have made previously nontradable services now tradable in principle. Although it is frequently argued (Friedman is a prime example) that this will lead to a rapid increase in services trade (which is true) and have drastic consequences for the structure of the world economy (which might be true), it is important to realize that goods trade is still about four times more important than services trade and is increasing at a speed which is at least as fast at the rise in services trade, see Table 6 . In any case, the main exporters of services are also the main exporters of goods and their regional distribution is quite similar. expressed fears with respect to factor cost seeking FDI are for the moment unwarranted. What is the relation between this type of investment and distance? Unfortunately, this effect is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the higher the trade costs, the higher this type of investment, because exporting becomes a more expensive alternative. On the other hand, distance also increases transaction costs; the further one is from home, the more cultures differ. So with respect to marketseeking investment, this has to be resolved empirically. Markusen (2002) shows that the net effect tends to be negative. This suggests that international investment flows behave very much like international trade flows: one likes to stay close to home. What are the effects on the labour markets?
Individual country evidence shows a somewhat mixed picture, as is discussed in Baldwin (2006) . For the OECD as a whole, the effects of offshoring seem limited (Van Welsum and Reif, 2005) .
Observation 8 (FDI is mostly market seeking)
The largest part of FDI flows originates from highincome countries and has as a destination another high-income country (i.e. is market-seeking FDI) taking into consideration the volatility of FDI flows. In the most recent period, there is indication that the share going to developing countries is (last 5 years) increasing. This is in accordance with Friedman's claim that most of the dynamics with respect to slicing up the value chain is of recent date. 
Conclusions
We review empirical evidence regarding per capita income levels and international trade and investment flows in relation to several claims made in Thomas Friedman's book The World is Flat. Using different data and methods, our findings are summarized in eight observations. We note, for example, that most countries exhibit economic growth and therefore do not stay in the same place as far as income per capita is concerned. We find no support for global convergence at the country level since 1950. We also note that the formidable population size of China and India ensures that developments in these countries have a global impact. It is for this reason, combined with the rapid economic developments in these two countries since 1980, that global income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) reached a peak in the 1970s and has declined since about 1980. Investigating income per capita relative to the world average, we observe that there is frequent leapfrogging (different countries are in the lead or lag behind). Moreover, over a longer time span of 2000 years, there is clearly income divergence: the leader's relative position improves and the laggard's relative position deteriorates over time. Hierarchies are therefore indeed challenged over time.
Going back further in time also shows that there is some support for convergence after 1000 or 2000 years, but no support for convergence since 1500. When focusing on international trade flows rather than income levels, we see that trade is to a large extent determined by distance; a 10% increase in distance reduces trade by about 9%. Moreover, the importance of distance seems to increase, not decrease, in the second half of the 20th century. Distance is also important for cross-border investment (FDI) flows, which mostly originate in highincome countries with a destination in another high-income country (market-seeking FDI). Taking into consideration the volatility of FDI flows, there is some indication that the share going to developing countries is recently (last 5 years) increasing.
Taking all eight observations together-as summarized in Table 8 -we find both support for Friedman's The World is Flat claims (or those of other death of distance proponents) and also more substantial evidence of the opposite. Friedman's most important contention that the world becomes smaller is not supported by the evidence; the influence of distance on world trade is not only strong but also increasing. In contrast to Friedman's 'shrinking world' arguments, this leads us to conclude that 'it's a big world after all'. Kravis et al. (1982) . Maddison uses the Geary-Khamis technique to ensure transitivity, base country invariance and additivity of the data. All GDP data estimates discussed in 'Income developments since 1950' to 'Leapfrogging; leaders and laggards for the last 2000 years' are denoted in GK$ and referred to as income. To put the GK$ into proper perspective, Maddison's estimate of income per capita in the USA in 2003 is GK$29,037 compared to the World Bank's $37,600 current international PPP dollars. This implies that the (1990) GK$ used in this paper is about 30% more valuable than 2003 international US PPP dollars. We will refer to GK$ as $ in the remainder of the paper. 4 This remark also holds for more sophisticated analyses of income inequality, like the famous r and b convergence concepts of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) . 5 Again similarly, 83 countries have a population smaller than 1% of the Chinese population in 2003, with a total of 452 million people (less than 35% of China's population). 6 Details are available from the authors upon request. 7 The Lorenz curves in Figure 4 therefore depict the most equal (2003) and the most unequal (1973) global income distribution in the period 1950-2003. 8 The weak link between globalization and income convergence is also supported by findings for the 1870 -1940 period, see Milanovic (2006b . 9 In fact, we refer here to FPE theorem in trade theory. The conditions for which this theorem holds are specific, as any textbook on trade theory will tell, but for a homogeneous product and workers doing similar tasks, and with the necessary model qualifications, the claim in the text is correct in a neoclassical world. More fundamentally, models based on NEG tell a different story: more integration can lead to a centre-periphery outcome in which factor prices are very different between countries (Krugman, 1991 
